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GAS, ROADS, AND GLORY: NORTH DAKOTA AND MHA
NATION’S STRUGGLE OVER FLARING REGULATION
ERICA BEACOM*
INTRODUCTION
A. North Dakota’s Unimaginable Oil Boom in the 21st Century
The westward march of American industry was written in
the quarters of plowed earth . . . it was visible even on the
far horizon, at the edge of a fretted but still bracing empti-
ness, in the shape of giant windmills and the silhouette of
a coal gasification plant. Each and all were contemporary
manifestations of an economic imperative that dates back
to the triumph of the treaty breakers who usurped the Native
Americans and commodified their land.1
North Dakota’s intricate history with the oil boom and bust cycle
first started in the 1960s when oil was first discovered in the state.2 The
cycle continued to evolve in the 1970s when inflation of oil prices drove
the market.3 During the 1970s, oil production peaked at 4.6 million
barrels.4 After twenty-five years, production was halved and then eventu-
ally petered out with the result accumulating in the known fact that no
new drilling wells were placed in the region after 1999.5
With technological advancements and the advent of horizontal
drilling, North Dakota’s bust cycle ended in 2007 with the rediscovery of
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2016; B.A. Anthropology and History, St.
Cloud State University, 2012. The author would like to thank her family, friends, profes-
sional mentors, and the wonderful staff of the William & Mary Law School Environmental
Law and Policy Review for their invaluable contributions and insight to this Note. A special
thank you to my father, who inspired the entirety of my Note and guided me through the
principles of energy exploration and state regulation.
1 Chip Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 3 Feb. 3, 2013, at MM22,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-boom.html
?r=0 [http://perma.cc/8SF2-A39X].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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the difficult to reach, but ever present, Bakken region.6 At that time North
Dakota was only ranked ninth in oil production within the United States.7
Recent reports have estimated crude oil production output in the Bakken
region around one million barrels of oil per day.8 With the impressive
jump in production coupled with advanced technology,9 North Dakota’s
piece of the Bakken region accounts for around ten percent of the United
States’ oil production.10 North Dakota’s current oil boom has raised the
state’s rank to second in oil production within the country, inferior only
to the state of Texas.11
B. Environmental Concerns with Oil Production and Flaring
The Bakken region12 is unique in its formation. None of the rocks
capable of oil production are visible on the surface, resulting in a geologi-
cal formation that has been compared to the structure of an “Oreo cookie.”13
To access the difficult formations, horizontal drilling14 was employed and
the region now boasts the longest horizontal wells in the world.15 But
even with advancement of precision horizontal drilling, ninety-five percent
6 Id.
7 Brown, supra note 1.
8 Bakken oil production forecast to top 1 million barrels per day next month, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 15, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id
=13811 [http://perma.cc/H4SZ-KEGM] [hereinafter Bakken oil production forecast].
9 Thomas W. Fredericks, Freeing Indian Energy Development from the Grips of Cotton:
Advancing Energy Independence for Tribal Nations, FREDERICKS, PEEBLES, & MORGAN
LLP (2013), http://www.ndnlaw.com/newsdocuments/FPM_Tom_Fredericks_Article_Federal
_Lawyer.pdf [http://perma.cc/QSE8-UHAF] (explaining that the boom is due to relaxed
federal policy, rising oil and gas prices, and innovations in extraction and production—oil
shale development and hydraulic fracturing for natural gas).
10 Bakken oil production forecast, supra note 8.
11 Id.
12 See Unconventional Oil & Gas: Bakken Shale, OIL & GAS FIN. JOURNAL, http://www
.ogfj.com/unconventional/bakken-shale.html [http://perma.cc/PGB6-NZR4] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015) (describing the Bakken Shale region as an oil play shared by both Canada
and the United States and located primarily in North Dakota and Montana).
13 Brown, supra note 1.
14 Jeff Brady, Focus on Fracking Diverts Attention From Horizontal Drilling, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 27, 2013, 5:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/27/170015508/focus-on-fracking
-diverts-attention-from-horizontal-drilling [http://perma.cc/E82J-92U6] (explaining that
horizontal drilling is the exact opposite of vertical drilling (i.e., drilling straight down to
the pocket of gas or oil) by the fact that horizontal drilling extends down then turns the
drill bit and extends the well horizontally to access the shale).
15 Brown, supra note 1.
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of the oil within the Bakken would remain inaccessible without the prac-
tice of hydraulic fracking.16 In addition to the known environmental
threats hydraulic fracking creates,17 North Dakota now faces major issues
in the corporation-driven natural gas flaring (“flaring”) practices cur-
rently employed in the Bakken region.18
In academia, flaring has been defined as the practice of burning
off natural gas.19 Specifically, “[f]laring is the controlled burning of natural
gas and a common practice in oil/gas exploration.”20 In the context of oil
production, “gas bubbles up” with the oil and, instead of capturing the
gas, oil companies treat the gas as waste and burn it.21 In 2011, the
Energy Information Administration reported that North Dakota’s oil
producers flared around 1.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas.22 This high
rate of flaring roughly equates to thirty-two percent of the total amount
of gas produced in North Dakota and the reported figures for 2012 have
only increased.23
The practice of flaring includes the negative consequences of:
killing surrounding vegetation; noise nuisance; and the insertion of soot,
toxic chemicals, and smoke into the atmosphere.24 In North Dakota, the
biggest threat from flaring practices are the fumes of pure methane that
are escaping unnoticed directly into the atmosphere.25 To understand the
profound danger of escaped methane seeping into the atmosphere, a brief
review of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and climate change must be examined.
In sum, CO2 emissions have been linked as one of the main drivers of
16 Id.
17 See Joe Hoffman, Potential Health and Environmental Effects of Hydrofracking in the
Williston Basin, Montana, GEOLOGY AND HUMAN HEALTH, http://serc.carleton.edu/NAGT
Workshops/health/case_studies/hydrofracking_w.html [http://perma.cc/8BY5-8KLJ] (last
modified June 26, 2014) (describing risk and concerns of fracking as contamination of
groundwater, methane pollution, air pollution, exposure to toxic chemicals, and blowouts
due to gas explosions).
18 Jeff Tollefson, Oil boom raises burning issues, 495 NATURE 290, 291 (2013).
19 GUSTAF OLSSON, WATER AND ENERGY: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 153 (2012).
20 Understanding the Basics of Gas Flaring, OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 2014),
http://www.epa.ohio.gov/Portals/27/oil%20and%20gas/Basics%20of%20Gas%20Flaring
.pdf [http://perma.cc/AX9A-6G8H].
21 OLSSON, supra note 19, at 153.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case
Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in Adjudicating CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 173, 176 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofksy eds., 2009).
25 Tollefson, supra note 18, at 291.
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climate change in the world26 as it has preceded the advent of increased
temperatures, rising sea levels, and the melting of the polar ice caps.27
The damage caused by CO2 increased emissions is well-documented;
28 the
research highlights the imminent danger that the world faces with natural
gas flaring, which contains methane boasting a warming power twenty-
five times higher than that of CO2.
29
At the moment scientists are unsure about the exact amount of
methane escaping into the atmosphere due to the Bakken region’s oil
production practices.30 However, it is known that in a best-case scenario—
where all methane is combusted—the natural gas flares will have added
nearly four million tons of C02 emissions over the course of the year in
2012.31 To create an accurate impression of the amount of emissions pro-
duced by flaring, a 2009 article reported that 278 million metric tons of
emitted gases are the equivalent of 50 million passenger car emissions.32
The emissions in the Bakken region consists of 4 million tons and, as one
atmospheric scientist states, compares to “running a medium-sized coal-
fired power plant in the prairie.”33
C. Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Tribe and the Bakken Region
The Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara are known as the “Three Affil-
iated Tribes” or the MHA Nation of North Dakota.34 MHA is federally
26 IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 13 (T.F. Stocker et al. eds.,
2013) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL
.pdf [http://perma.cc/RLD5-5F6N].
27 Id. at 3.
28 See generally IPCC, supra note 26; The Royal Soc’y and U.S. Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Climate
Change: Evidence and Causes, 1 (2014), available at http://nas-sites.org/americascli
matechoices/events/a-discussion-on-climate-change-evidence-and-causes/ [http://perma.cc
/5W6C-C4TE]; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, OVERVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, in U.S. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, 2–19 (2014) (on
file with author).
29 Tollefson, supra note 18, at 291.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Christopher D. Elvidge et al., A Fifteen Year Record of Global Natural Gas Flaring
Derived from Satellite Data, 2 ENERGIES 595, 619 (2009), available at http://www.mdpi
.com/1996-1073/2/3/595 [http://perma.cc/J7B8-UXXD].
33 Tollefson, supra note 18, at 291.
34 MHA History, MHA NATION, http://www.mhanation.com/main2/history.html [http://
perma.cc/8YNS-PLKL] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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recognized35 with an established, sovereign land base on Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation.36 Fort Berthold exists within parts of six North
Dakota counties in the west-central part of the state.37 The total area of
the reservation is roughly 1530 square miles, and approximately eleven
percent of the land is covered by water38 due to the construction of the
Garrison Dam brought on by the Pick-Sloan Project.39 In 2009, due to
negotiations between the Tribe, the United States, and the state of North
Dakota, Fort Berthold was opened to oil exploration and production.40
Fort Berthold’s 930,000 acres rests upon the highly lucrative Bakken
region, which currently hosts drilling rigs, active wells, and a large num-
ber of nearly completed wells posed to produce almost 250,000 barrels of
oil a day.41 More than $500 million have been generated by fracking leases
and oil royalties that benefit the entire MHA Nation.42 Current rough
estimates of future production forecast almost an additional $1 million
per month, payable to the MHA Nation.43
35 Andrew Schill, Obstacles to Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, ABADIE SCHILL (July 4, 2012) (on file with author); see also Treaty of Fort
Laramie with Sioux, et al., 1851 (Sept. 17, 1851), available at http://indianlaw.mt.gov
/content/multi/treaties/1851_fort_laramie.pdf [http://perma.cc/8MCE-E3LQ].
36 Laws and Treaties: The 1851 Treaty at Fort Laramie, The History and Culture of the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Sahnish, NORTH DAKOTA STUDIES, http://www.ndstudies.org
/resources/IndianStudies/threeaffiliated/historical_laws.html [http://perma.cc/XT9T-29YL]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
37 N.D. INDIAN AFFAIRS COMM’N, FACTS AND PROFILES: INDIANS IN NORTH DAKOTA, 8
(1999), available at http://www.nd.gov/indianaffairs/image/cache/NDIAC_Facts_and_Profiles
.pdf [http://perma.cc/JC8N-MXKN].
38 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Fort Berthold Reservation, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, https://www1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/pdfs/fort_berthold
.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8HL-NLUH] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
39 Id.; The History and Culture of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Sahnish, Tribal Historical
Overview—1900s—Garrison Dam, NORTH DAKOTA STUDIES, http://www.ndstudies.org
/resources/IndianStudies/threeaffiliated/historical_1900s_garrison.html [http://perma.cc
/D89J-W9ZM] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
40 James MacPherson, North Dakota Oil Tax Agreement Nets $40 Million Monthly for
State, Fort Berthold Reservation, MHA NATION (Dec. 9, 2013) http://www.mhanation.com
/main2/Home_News/Home_News_2013/News_2013_12_December/news_2013_december
_09_north_dakota_oil_tax_agreement_nets_$40_million_monthly_for_state_fort_berthold
_reservation.html [http://perma.cc/7WH5-68FZ].
41 Bakken oil production forecast, supra note 8; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 38.
42 Curt Brown, While North Dakota embraces the oil boom, tribal members ask environ-
mental questions, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 25, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.startribune.com/n-d
-tribal-members-question-oil-boom-s-effects-on-sacred-land/233854981/ [http://perma.cc
/8U6E-S9ET].
43 Id.
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Due to the reservation’s new status in the oil production sphere
and the Tribe’s ongoing commitment to preserving the land for future
generations, the current corporations flaring practices have come to the
forefront of Tribal concern.44 MHA Nation has formulated and approved
tribal flaring regulations,45 through Tribal legislature, to mitigate the
negative effects of flaring.46 With Tribal Council approval the promul-
gated regulations can be imposed on all oil companies operating on MHA
trust land.47
Because flaring rates have garnered much attention on both the
national and international scales,48 the timely and efficient approval of
tribal flaring regulations should have been considered prudent. But both
the state of North Dakota and the Tribe took up the gauntlet in defend-
ing the land from the excessive flaring practices, which lead to conflicting
flaring regulations.49 The conflicts between the two sets of flaring regula-
tions have raised the age-old question of state sovereignty versus tribal
sovereignty.50 Sovereignty questions in turn have resulted in a $1 billion
industry questioning whether investment into tribe-controlled land and
resources is worth the cost of implementing the newly minted, stringent
flaring regulations imposed by both the Tribal and State governments.51
44 Mike Kopp, MHA Nation Oil and Gas Expo addresses environmental and infrastructure
plans, BAKKEN.COM (Apr. 10, 2014), http://bakken.com/news/id/136792/mha-nation-oil
-gas-expo-addresses-environmental-infrastructure-plans/ [http://perma.cc/U88C-EEAG];
Vincent Schilling, Tex Hall Vying for Fourth Term as Three Affiliated Tribes Chairman,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 9, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/2014/09/09/tex-hall-vying-fourth-term-three-affiliated-tribes-chairman
-156786 [http://perma.cc/82XP-4M6Y].
45 Resolution of the Governing Body of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation, Res. No. 13-070-VJB (N.D. 2013), available at http://www.mhanation
.com/main2/elected_officials/elected_officials_resolutions/resolutions_2013/May%2009,
%202013%20Meeting.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PH6-4W89].
46 Id.
47 See Indian Reorganization Act 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461–79 (June 18, 1934), available at http://
www.uintahbasintah.org/papers/indianreorganizationact.pdf [http://perma.cc/7RDQ-VGJF].
48 See Sinden, supra note 24; OLSSON, supra note 19, at 153; Kopp, supra note 44.
49 See generally Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45; Notice to Lessees and Operator
of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A), Dep’t of Interior (Jan. 1,
1980); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-44-45 (2000), 43-02-03-60.1-.3 (2014), 4602-03-88.1 (2014),
available at https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/rules/rulebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VD2
-MRFK].
50 See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIANS TRIBES,
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW:
SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1790–1880 (2007).
51 James Macpherson, ND regulators adopt natural gas flaring rules, YAHOO FIN. (July 2,
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D. Roadmap
This Note argues that the best practice for both economic gain
and respect for tribal sovereignty would be to allow the MHA Nation to
protect, implement, and regulate their own resources and land without
the state of North Dakota’s interference and repetitive flaring regula-
tions. Part I presents and dissects the background law concerning tribal
sovereignty, state sovereignty, the United States and tribal relationship,
oil and mineral leases, the Department of Interior’s role in leasing con-
tracts, and ultimately case law surrounding the fiduciary relationship
between the United States and Native American tribes. Part II will lay
out the legal dimensions of the Tribe’s arguments for absolute control
over flaring regulations on Fort Berthold reservation. Part II also ad-
dresses the issue of royalties and attests to the fact that if continued
unchecked, North Dakota will follow the historical cycle of exploiting
tribal resources at the expense of Native American welfare. Part III
establishes protocol for the best resolution of the quagmire at the center
of the war for control of oil production and flaring practices on Fort
Berthold reservation. The Conclusion aims to balance Native American
rights and state sovereignty in the hope of providing clear industrial
regulations to further oil exploration and production for the benefit of all
MHA tribal members.
I. GREAT PLAINS’ POWER: BACKGROUND OF STATE AND
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. Bakken Region: Location, Production, Future
The Bakken shale region extends over the United States border
into Canada and is located in the Williston Basin,52 which boasts twenty
different oil-producing geological formations.53 The northern limit of the
Bakken region ends somewhere in the Canadian provinces of Saskatche-
wan and Manitoba.54 The Bakken region of the United States ranges from
east to west through both Montana and North Dakota.55 The southern
2014, 1:21 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nd-regulators-adopt-natural-gas-215512814
.html [http://perma.cc/K8G4-RRHK].
52 See Unconventional Oil & Gas: Bakken Shale, supra note 12.
53 Brown, supra note 1.
54 Unconventional Oil & Gas: Bakken Shale, supra note 12.
55 Id.
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boundary is estimated to end past the central point of both Montana and
North Dakota.56
The Bakken region is estimated to produce ninety-one percent of
North Dakota’s total oil production.57 The great productivity of the Bakken
is surprising due to the fact that the Bakken rocks, which produce crude
oil, are not visible on the surface of the state.58 Instead the Bakken rocks
lie almost two miles underground and consist of three layers commonly
analogized as an “Oreo cookie.”59 Knowledge pertinent to the productivity
rates of the Bakken region was established in the 1950s.60 The problem
was that Bakken oil was considered to be “tight,”61 a term that refers to
the porous nature of rocks. Specifically in the Bakken region the rocks
are neither porous nor permeable, which results in a lock on oil because
none of the material flows on its own.62
Even with these hurdles oil production in North Dakota managed
a small boom during the 1960s with vertical wells, but this method of
production included finding a naturally occurring fracture in the earth.63
Natural fractures turned out to be a rare breed in North Dakota, and those
that were found keyed into thin formations.64 However, in the late 1980s
with the advent of horizontal drilling, the Bakken region started to become
a viable production option again.65 Horizontal drilling in North Dakota
consists of drilling down tens of thousands of feet and then maneuvering
sideways into the Middle Bakken sandstone.66
But horizontal drilling was not enough to rehabilitate North Da-
kota back to a viable oil production “boom” cycle.67 The necessary factor
came with the introduction of the new practice of blasting gallons of
pressurized water into the ground to release the tight formations within
56 Id.
57 Brown, supra note 1.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Brown, supra note 1.
64 See generally Stephen D. Sturm & Ernest Gomez, Role of Natural Fracturing in Pro-
duction from the Bakken Formation, Williston Basin, North Dakota, SEARCH AND DISCOVERY
(Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2009/50199sturm/ [http://
perma.cc/K95D-QDKY]; Brown, supra note 1, at 6.
65 Brown, supra note 1.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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the Bakken shale.68 Commonly known as ‘hydraulic fracturing’ or ‘frack-
ing’ the method consists of sending “pressurized water full of sand and
various chemicals . . . down the well to crack open hairline channels.”69
Without fracking, ninety-five percent of the Bakken region would be in-
accessible for oil production purposes.70
The Bakken boom officially started for North Dakota in 2007 and
was driven forward purely by technological refinements such as horizon-
tal drilling and the advent of fracking practices as a whole.71 In 2007,
North Dakota ranked ninth in the United States’ oil producing states.72
In 2013 the state was reported to have moved in to second place, behind
only Texas in crude oil production.73 The U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration also reported that in 2013 Bakken oil accounted for about
ten percent or higher of total United States oil production.74
Estimates of exactly how much viable oil lies within the Bakken
region are unknown.75 Productivity figures are continuously rehashed
and increased on a daily basis.76 In 1974, it was reported that there may
have been ten billion barrels of oil in the ground.77 In 2000, the region
was estimated to hold almost 503 billion barrels of oil.78 Recent figures
in 2013 report that there may be as much as 169 billion barrels of oil in
the Bakken region.79 Experts, critics, and proponents of the oil production
in Bakken region only agree on one point: productivity numbers remain
continuously in flux.80 If North Dakota’s domestic ranking as second in
oil productivity holds, then the future productivity of the Bakken region
68 Id.
69 Brown, supra note 1; See The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://www2.epa
.gov/hydraulicfracturing/process-hydraulic-fracturing [http://perma.cc/42WS-XB88] (last
updated Aug. 11, 2014).
70 Brown, supra note 1.
71 Id.
72 Bakken oil production forecast, supra note 8.
73 Id.
74 Id. See also Brown, supra note 1 (forecasting the percent of North Dakota’s contribution
to U.S. oil production at eleven percent).
75 Brown, supra note 1.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Bakken oil production forecast, supra note 8.
80 Sari Horwitz, Dark Side of the Boom: North Dakota’s oil rush brings cash and promise
to reservation, along with drug fueled crime, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/09/28/dark-side-of-the-boom/ [http://perma.cc/6BHY
-PZAY].
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will catapult to the top of North Dakota’s economic diversification and
will remain there for at least one generation.81
B. Tribal Sovereignty: Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara, the Three
Affiliated Tribes
MHA Nation’s reservation lies in the heart of the Bakken Shale
production.82 The land was created and reserved for the MHA Nation in
1851 by the Fort Laramie Treaty,83 which set aside twelve million acres
of protected lands for the Three Affiliated Tribes.84 By 1947 the United
States government implemented the Garrison Dam project85 and created
Lake Sakakawea.86 The dam project swallowed four hundred and seventy-
nine square miles of Fort Berthold Reservation.87 The consequences were
severe for the Tribe as at least eight Indian communities lay completely
submerged, along with the majority of the farming and ranching econ-
omy that sustained the MHA Nation.88 Currently, Fort Berthold reserva-
tion registers approximately 422,750 acres spread through six counties.89
Because the entirety of reservation land lies within the Bakken Shale
formation, the majority of the MHA Nation has been eager to jump-start
the reservation’s self-sufficiency movement with an influx of oil produc-
tion capital.90
81 Brown, supra note 1.
82 Horwitz, supra note 80.
83 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND BROKEN PROMISES: 1851 TO
1877 89 (2014), available at http://www.nps.gov/wica/historyculture/upload/-7e-5-Chapter
-Five-Treaties-and-Broken-Promises-Pp-84-132.pdf [http://perma.cc/SLU9-94XN]. See
generally Charles D. Bernholz & Brian L. Pytlik Zillig, The Treaty of Fort Laramie with
Sioux, etc., 1851: Revisiting the document found in Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Law and
Treaties, UNIV. NEB., LINCOLN, http://treatyoffortlaramie1851.unl.edu [http://perma.cc
/BRF6-JHQU] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (explaining the background, Indian policy, and
reserved land system negotiated in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851).
84 Horwitz, supra note 80.
85 See generally History & Federal Legislation: The Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program,
GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DIST., http://www.garrisondiv.org/about_us/history
_federal_legislation/ [http://perma.cc/J6JF-7HGS] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
86 Horwitz, supra note 80.
87 Id.
88 Id.; Bob Reha, Water Wars: The lost towns of Lake Sakakawea, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(July 2, 2003), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/07/02_rehab_river
history/ [http://perma.cc/EZU6-NB75].
89 N.D. INDIAN AFFAIRS COMM’N, supra note 37.
90 Horwitz, supra note 80; Brown, supra note 1.
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Tribal land, sovereignty, and resource control all fall into a shift-
ing area of law that is continuously negotiated through interpretation of
the United States Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall’s nation-to-nation
policy, and subsequent statutes passed by Congress.91 Upon the advent
of the United States Constitution, relations between the tribes and the
European settlers were sustained in a shaky coexistence that would
eventually devolve into destruction and forcible removal for growth of
colonist civilization.92 In that established cultural norm, the Founding
Fathers set the United States Constitution to mention and regulate
tribes and tribal relations in a mere three sections.93
The first mention of tribes within the United States Constitution
resides in the Fourteenth Amendment, Section Two, stating that “[r]ep-
resentatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several states according
to their respective numbers . . . excluding Indians not taxed . . . .”94 The
second mention appears in Article I, Section Eight, stating that “[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.”95 The third mention would later appear in
the Fourteenth Amendment, added to correct apportionment of represen-
tatives, but still held Indian status in a separate capacity.96 For each brief
mention of Indians within the United States Constitution, it becomes clear
that the federal government, Founding Fathers, and general European
population held tribes as separate entities from the newly developed
United States of America.97
With this foundation set in the United States Constitution, the
next cycle of tribal relations and United States citizenry fell to Chief Justice
Marshall. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Marshall writing for
the majority, was tasked with the responsibility to delineate the roles,
responsibilities, and rights of tribes.98 These three cases are known as
91 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 50, at 4–7.
92 Id.
93 Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribes and the American Constitution, in AMERICAN INDIANS,
TIMES, AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL RIGHTS AT THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT 117, 119
(1987), available at http://users.humboldt.edu/erick/econ323/topics/wilkinson.pdf [http://
perma.cc/H5MG-P564].
94 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
97 Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural
Sovereignty and the Collective Future Of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191,
191–92 (2001).
98 Id. at 192.
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the “Marshall trilogy” and are the bedrock for understanding the tribal–
United States relationship.99 Marshall grounded all of his arguments in
the fact that treaty relationships had been a part of the British negotia-
tions with tribes.100 In his rationale, treaty making was a duty that the
United States of America inherited after the American Revolution and
it included all past treaty rights, actions, and obligations.101 This under-
standing of the treaty relationship conceptualized Marshall’s idea that
Indian tribes and their respective territories were “domestic, dependent
nations.”102 The basic effect of this definition was to separate the idea of
a foreign nation (and therefore nation sovereignty) from the assumption
of complete foreign nation power. Chief Justice Marshall achieved this by
expressly stating that tribes, as “domestic dependent nations,” were under
the sole protection of the United States by treaty making, and by accepting
United States “protection” tribal sovereignty was to be severely limited.103
Adding to the distinction was the fact that Indian tribes were pre-
constitutional entities.104 “Pre-constitutional” is defined as existence be-
fore the formation of the United States, and maintaining continuous
individual authority over tribal territory from an earlier point then the
newly formed, colonial government.105 The modern federal-tribe rules of
regulation, negotiation, and contracts all harken back to Marshall’s basic
understanding of the nation-to-nation policy, and the effects (positive and
negative) of this understanding have carried through to every aspect of
Indian regulation.106
The first natural consequence of Marshall’s policy is that states
are forbidden from applying state law in Indian territory.107 Because
tribes were placed on the federal level in negotiations and interactions, the
state-tribe relationship is non-existent except where the tribe or federal
government expressly consent.108 The second consequence is that tribal
sovereignty and tribal territory are irrevocably linked.109 In Marshall’s
sovereign formula tribes must demonstrate their precolonial existence,
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 192.
106 Id.
107 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15–21 (1831).
108 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 192.
109 Id.
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which in that time period meant overt control within a set territorial
boundary.110 Without a land base that tribes could claim as their own, the
federal government could not reconcile their status as an autonomous
cultural group with their identity as a sovereign nation.111 Marshall’s last
legacy in Indian policy is his creation of the “domestic, dependent na-
tions” status.112 This designation has been widely litigated as state gov-
ernments, tribes, and the federal government each attempt to delineate
the exact sovereign status that this facially clear, but overall ambiguous
title, conveys.113
Because states were cut out early in the tribe-federal government
relationship a lot of scrutiny and effort has gone into shaping tribal sover-
eignty through federal authority.114 In the eighteenth century tribal sov-
ereignty was shaped in its entirety by Marshall’s policy.115 Simplistically,
Marshall attempted to create autonomous tribal governments caveated
or preempted only by federal government authority.116 As Marshall’s
policy played out the Court saw an influx of cases to determine the extent
of control over tribes.117 First impression resulted in a broad policy, tribes
were held not to be bound by the Constitution or by federal law unless Con-
gress explicitly brought or listed the tribes in the proposed legislation.118
In the nineteenth century the broad policy started to narrow with
land demands and violent incidents between tribes and settlers growing.119
Indian policy shifted from autonomous tribes to the view that tribes were
“heathens” and in need of a good “parental role model.”120 This started
the negative, paternalistic side of Indian-federal policy cycle with the
tribes slotted as wards of the nation involved with the federal govern-
ment through a fiduciary relationship.121
110 Id. at 192–93.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 192.
113 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17–18, 20.
114 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 192.
115 Id.
116 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 191–92.
117 MELODY KAPILIALOHA MACKENZIE ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 1.03(4)(a) (Nell Jessup Newson et. al. eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook].
118 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 193.
119 Alexandra Lutz, The Indian Wars: Struggle Between Native Americans and Settlers,
STUDY.COM, http://study.com/academy/lesson/the-indian-wars-struggle-between-native
-americans-and-settlers.html [http://perma.cc/RMZ9-3C35] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
120 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 192.
121 Andrew Boxer, Native Americans and the Federal Government, HISTORY REVIEW (2009),
http://www.historytoday.com/andrew-boxer/native-americans-and-federal-government
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The paternalistic era of policy applied itself in a variety of ways.
The biggest fall out was the Supreme Court removing itself out of regula-
tion and review of legislation implemented against the tribes.122 This left
tribes floundering under the Allotment Act passed by Congress, which
opened up tribal land to white settlement—essentially destroying the
homogeneity and safety of tribal sovereignty on reserved land.123 But the
Court and the Federal government have since relaid the foundation of
inherent tribal sovereignty by resurrecting the concept of domestic,
dependent nation status.124
One of the carried-over principles from the paternalistic policy era
was the idea that prevention of tribal control over non-native persons re-
siding within trust land of tribes was a necessary rule.125 The fear being
that, if allowed, tribes would drag non-natives into an alien legal system
rigged to be inherently against non-native status.126 This fear culminated
in the Montana v. United States case that held that tribes were free to
regulate trust lands and land of tribal members but could not extend
tribal regulations to non-natives.127 The test applied in the case stated,
“[regulation of non natives] bears no clear relationship to tribal self-
government or internal relations.”128 Simply stated, if the tribes want to
effectuate their power (tribal sovereignty) they must show that it is con-
sistent with their “domestic, dependent nation” status and is expressly
authorized by Congress.129
1. The Indian Reorganization Act
MHA Nation established its tribal government in the aftermath of
the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.130 The Indian Reorganization Act was
created with a multiprong plan of attack in developing Indian self-suffi-
ciency but with the maintenance of the United States’ firm paternalistic
[http://perma.cc/CZ9E-DFZG]; Reid Peyton Chambers, Enforcing the Trust Responsibility:
Presentation to the Secretarial Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform
(Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.doi.gov/cobell/commission/upload/5-1-Enforcing-the-Federal
-Trust-Responsibility-RPC-4-29-13.PDF [https://perma.cc/9MCN-9DYT].
122 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 193.
123 Id.
124 Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.bia.gov/Who
WeAre/BIA/ [http://perma.cc/RYS7-DGUY] (last updated Sept. 22, 2015, 5:45 PM).
125 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 117, at § 7.02(1)(a).
126 Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 97, at 193.
127 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981).
128 Id. at 564.
129 Id. at 564–65.
130 N.D. INDIAN AFFAIRS COMM’N, supra note 37, at 5.
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attitude in future Indian policies.131 The first issue that the Act dealt with
was the federal government’s preoccupation with selling land out from
underneath tribes.132 A firm moratorium was applied to sale of land, the
only exception being that the Secretary of the Interior can partake in vol-
untary exchange of lands if the standards of equality in the agreement
are beneficial for the tribe and Indian land as a whole.133 The second issue
the Act addresses is the attempt to develop Indian lands and resources
by establishing infrastructure necessary to build tribal businesses and
to create sufficient educational systems on reservations.134
But the most important part of the Indian Reorganization Act is
Section Sixteen, which established the right to organize tribal members
residing on reservations to effectuate common welfare.135 The section
explicitly lays out the right to create a constitution and bylaws that could
be ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe.136 The
Act also explicitly stated that powers will vest with tribes once voters
pass the constitution and bylaws.137 Tribes will have the rights and powers
to: employ legal counsel, prevent sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance
on tribal lands without the consent of the tribe, and the power to negoti-
ate with Federal, State, and local governments.138
These powers and rights are taken a step further with Section
Seventeen of the Act, which establishes an opportunity for a tribe to obtain
a charter of incorporation upon petition of one-third of adult tribal members
to the Secretary of Interior.139 If approved, the adult members of the tribe
must ratify the charter of incorporation by a majority vote.140 If ratified by
the tribe a charter of incorporation will convey to the tribe the power to:
[P]urchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise own, hold,
manage, operate, and dispose of property of every descrip-
tion, real and personal, including the power to purchase
restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefore
interests in corporate property, and such further powers
131 See Indian Reorganization Act, at ch. 576.
132 Boxer, supra note 121.
133 Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, §§ 2–4.
134 Id. at ch. 576, § 1.
135 Id. at ch. 576, § 16.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Indian Reorganization Act, at ch. 576 § 17.
140 Id.
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as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business
not inconsistent with law, but no authority shall be granted
to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years
any of the land included in the limits of the reservation.141
2. Application of Indian Reorganization Act for the MHA
The MHA Nation ratified their constitution on May 15, 1936.142
The Secretary of the Interior approved the document on June 29, 1936,
and henceforth it has been one of the main pillars of Tribal authority on
Fort Berthold reservation.143 Under Section Three, MHA Nation’s consti-
tution explicitly states that they hold the power to levy taxes and license
fees on non-members conducting business on the reservation and are
only limited in their power to regulate by federal law governing trade of
tribes.144 Section Five reserves the power to manage all economic affairs
and enterprises of the MHA Nation through the Tribal Business Council,
which is the head governing body of MHA Nation.145 Section Five also
reserves the right to negotiate with Federal, State, and local governments
to the Tribal Business Council in the best interest of the Tribe.146 The
Tribal Business Council also reserved the right to approve or veto sales,
leases, or encumbrances of MHA trust lands.147 The Council also holds
responsibility to protect and preserve property, wildlife, and natural re-
sources of the Tribe, which, paired with their reservation of power for
management of all Tribal lands through assignments or leases, seems to
spell out firm control over interests and resources found within Fort
Berthold reservation.148
The second piece of MHA Nation control over their trust land and
resources comes from their charter of incorporation mentioned in the
Indian Reorganization Act.149 The Secretary of the Interior approved and
141 Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 17.
142 Constitution and Bylaws of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
(approved June 29. 1936), available at http://lib.fortbertholdcc.edu/FortBerthold/TAT
const.asp [http://perma.cc/D75X-5CRU].
143 Constitution and Bylaws of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
supra note 142; see also Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45.
144 Constitution and Bylaws of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
supra note 142, at § 3.
145 Id. at § 5(a).
146 Id. at § 5(d).
147 Id. at § 5(e).
148 Id. at § 5(I)–(J).
149 See Resolution No.13-070-VJB, supra note 45.
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sent the charter for ratification of the Tribe on April 1, 1937.150 MHA Na-
tion hosted the referendum and ratified on April 24, 1937.151 The charter’s
purpose focuses on laying the foundation for economic development of the
MHA Nation.152 In line with the paternalistic tradition, the only restric-
tions placed on the Tribe in their bid for economic development are found
in the Constitution or laws of the United States.153 The Tribe explicitly
reserves the authority to purchase, hold, manage, operate, or dispose of
real or personal property except in certain situations.154 One of the re-
stricted situations that this broad power does not effect is the sale or
mortgage of land or interest in land by the Tribe.155 This includes water
rights, oil, gas, and other mineral rights found in the trust lands of MHA
Nation.156 Simply put, the Tribe may not sell or mortgage land or natural
resources (including oil and gas) found within their trust lands.157 But
the Charter does leave room for the Tribe to manage and operate real
and personal property.158 The reservation of power regarding sale or mort-
gage reflects the federal government’s traditional belief that all tribes are
wards of the government and must be subject to strict scrutiny in eco-
nomic transactions—implicating debts and profits.159
3. MHA Charter of Incorporation Applied to Bakken
Shale Production
One of the most important limitations placed on the MHA Nation
under their charter of incorporation is the policy that neither the Tribe,
nor anyone acting on behalf of the Tribe, can take part in action that will
destroy or injure natural resources of the Fort Berthold Reservation.160
The charter demands that any leases, permits, or contracts, regardless
150 Corporate Charter of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
North Dakota, Preamble (Apr. 24, 1937), available at http://lib.fortbertholdcc.edu/Fort
Berthold/TATcorp.asp [http://perma.cc/WLP7-P8KR].
151 Id.
152 Id. at Corporate Existence and Purposes.
153 Id. at Corporate Powers § 5.
154 Id. at Corporate Powers § 5(b).
155 Id. at Corporate Powers § 5(b)(1).
156 Constitution and Bylaws of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
supra note 142, at § 5(b)(1).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Boxer, supra note 121.
160 Constitution and Bylaws of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
supra note 142, at Powers § 5(b)(4).
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of whether they were approved by the Secretary of the Interior, have to
conform to the federal regulations governing matters between tribes and
the federal government.161 If they do not conform, they are immediately
rendered inapplicable and are revoked by the discretion of the Secretary
of the Interior.162 The charter then specifically highlights the issues of
contracts and agreements that must be aligned with the charter.163 Any
corporation, including the state of North Dakota, that engages in leases
or contracts with the Tribe must abide by the regulations found within
the charter.164
4. Tax Agreement with North Dakota for Oil Exploration
Prior to the 2008 Tax Agreement minimal drilling was occurring on
Fort Berthold Reservation.165 To be exact, a well had not been drilled on
reservation lands for twenty-seven years.166 Factors that contributed to
this lack of development were cited as: complex tribal rules, uncertainty
of tax standards and rates, and unpredictable regulatory structure.167
Industry wariness was reported to stem from the belief that a tribal tax on
top of a state tax would make drilling and production too costly to justify
investment.168 But with the 2008 Tax Agreement, between the state of
North Dakota and MHA Nation, that uncertainty was to melt away and
lead to an increase in development.169 After the agreement, horizontal
wells on Fort Berthold increased from a singular well to over one thou-
sand wells.170 With the increase in development Fort Berthold reserva-
tion now accounts for a “huge portion” of the state’s oil production.171
The MHA Nation and the state of North Dakota signed the oil and
gas tax agreement on June 10, 2008, which established a single taxation
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at § 5(f).
165 Amy Dalrymple, New Oil Tax Agreement for Three Affiliated Tribes in the Works, MHA
NATION (Apr. 5, 2013 12:00 AM), http://mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/Home_News
_2013/News_2013_04_April/news_2013_april05_new_oil_tax_agreement_for_tat_in_the
_works.html [http://perma.cc/RBL6-7VUH].
166 Id.
167 MacPherson, supra note 40; Dalrymple, supra note 165.
168 Dalrymple, supra note 165.
169 MacPherson, supra note 40.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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system for oil and gas production on Fort Berthold Reservation.172 In this
Agreement the taxation system was described as a streamlined version
of both Tribal and State tax systems.173 The 2008 Agreement designated
the state of North Dakota as the solo administrator of the streamlined
taxation system.174 The Agreement also specifically stated that by employ-
ing a single taxation system the Tribe in no capacity relinquished their
respective tax jurisdiction.175 The obvious goal of the document is to cir-
cumvent the biggest hurdle of reservation economic development—the
possibility of double taxation on oil and gas production.
The 2008 Tax Agreement had specific reporting guidelines for the
taxation of oil and gas sales and purchases from wells within the reserva-
tion.176 The distinction of importance that effects how much revenue the
Tribe will receive is the qualification of the land in use.177 This distinc-
tion is established by the definition of Trust Land178 versus Non-Trust
Land.179 Simply put, Non-Trust Land is viewed as the private land180 on
Fort Berthold reservation.181
Within the bounds of the 2008 Tax Agreement, Trust Land taxation
and revenue sharing on a well was computed in four forms: oil taxation,
gas taxation, oil and gas tax exemptions, and oil and gas revenue sharing.182
Oil and gas revenue sharing was split evenly, with fifty percent of gross
production and oil extraction taxes collected and paid to the Tribe.183
172 Letter from Cory Fong, Comm’r, State of North Dakota Office of State Tax Commission,
to Producers, Purchasers, and Processors of Oil Production in North Dakota (July 11, 2008)
[hereinafter Fong Letter], available at https://www.nd.gov/tax/oilgas/threeatribes/pubs
/tatagreementnotice.pdf?20150129104446 [https://perma.cc/M4NV-KUR2].
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 2.
178 Trust Land is defined as “all mineral acres in a producing spacing unit held in trust
by the United States of America (“USA”) for the Tribes or an individual tribal member.”
179 Non-Trust Land is defined “as all other mineral acres in a producing unit not classified
as Trust Lands.” Fong Letter, supra note 172.
180 History of Allotment, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/resources
/land-tenure-history/allotment [https://perma.cc/CL5H-C9RV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015)
(explaining private land on reservations is a product of the General Allotment Act of 1887,
(commonly known as the Dawes Act) that created a system where members of a tribe
selected 40–160 acres of land for their personal use, and, if the reservation held more
land than needed for individual allotment to tribal members, the federal government was
allowed to negotiate purchase of the excess land and then sell it to non-Indian settlers).
181 MacPherson, supra note 40.
182 Fong Letter, supra note 172.
183 Id. at 2.
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On Non-Trust Land the same four categories of taxation and reve-
nue applied.184 The difference occurred in the oil and gas revenue sharing
percentages. Instead of being evenly split as the Trust Lands were, Non-
Trust Land tax rates were allocated at a twenty percent rate of the gross
production taxes to the Tribe.185 The State collected eighty percent of the
gross production and, in addition, collected one hundred percent of the
oil extraction taxes collected from the Non-Trust Lands.186 This skewed
taxation rate payable on Non-Trust Lands for the state also included a
provision that, in five years, the 80:20 ratio of gross production taxes
would become 100 percent allocated taxes paid solely to the State.187
Under the 2008 Tax Agreement, the 2013 revenue shares of the
Tribe would have been $131.8 million with the State figure listed at
$176.8 million.188 But in 2010, MHA Nation, led by Chairman Levings,
indicated to the North Dakota legislature that the Tribe would break the
existing tax agreement if the terms were not renegotiated.189 MHA Na-
tion proposed a new agreement that would eliminate the 2008 Tax Agree-
ment in favor of an equal division of the extraction and production taxes
on Non-Trust Land.190 With the renegotiated terms, the North Dakota
Tax Department estimated that the Tribe would receive an additional
$81 million in the 2013–15 period.191 The State was estimated to gain $6
million in the same period, but alleged that the State would lose $76 mil-
lion in the 2015–17 period.192
Surprisingly, the North Dakota legislature—and major oil compa-
nies that operate on a reservation—all supported an equalization of tax
revenue split between the State and Tribe.193 The main issue at stake was
the wish of the legislators to condition the extra tax revenue.194 Legislators
wanted to require MHA government to funnel the money exclusively to
reservation infrastructure concerns.195 The legislators’ request was met
with significant resistance; the MHA asserting tribal sovereignty and
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Dalrymple, supra note 165.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Dalrymple, supra note 165.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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both sides calling for accountability and transparency of all spending of
tax-generated funds.196
On January 13, 2010, Marcus D. Levings, Chairman of the Three
Affiliated Tribes, and John Hoeven, Governor of the State of North Dakota,
signed the 2010 Oil and Gas Tax Agreement (“2010 Tax Agreement”).197
The 2010 tax agreement explicitly stated that it superseded all oil and gas
agreements promulgated prior to its enactment (i.e., superceded the 2008
Tax Agreement).198 The 2010 Tax Agreement duration was listed as in-
definite unless formally cancelled by one of the parties.199 It also did not
address the Non-Trust Land inequitable taxation standard, and in fact
listed the same terms as seen in the 2008 Tax Agreement.200 Specifically,
the term that established that the State would continue to receive eighty
percent of the taxation of Non-Trust Lands with the Tribe collecting only
twenty percent remains intact.201 The only clear, substantial difference is
that the State vacated the clause that dropped the Tribe completely from
tax revenue generated by Non-Trust Land.202
The 2010 Tax Agreement lends insight to the flaring regulation
dispute in several of its provisions. Part B of the agreement specifically
lists “[S]overeign [I]mmunity” as an ideal to be protected.203 The provision
goes on to express that if litigation does occur that the agreement itself
cannot be used in any way, other than to enforce its terms.204 Part C
acknowledges the Tribal right of jurisdiction over imposition of produc-
tion and extraction taxes on oil and gas activities on reservation.205 But,
in the same paragraph, Part C expressly grants and acknowledges State
asserted jurisdiction subject to inherent limitations on a reservation to
tax oil and gas activities on the reservation.206 If businesses were hoping
to have a clear explanation on authority and jurisdiction within the res-
ervation, they will not find it in the 2010 Tax Agreement.
196 Id.
197 Oil and Gas Tax Agreement Between the Three Affiliated Tribes and State of North
Dakota, Three Affiliated Tribes-State of ND, Jan. 13, 2010 [hereinafter 2010 Tax Agree-
ment], available at https://www.nd.gov/tax/oilgas/threeatribes/pubs/oilgastaxagreement
.pdf?20150129110954 [https://perma.cc/MM56-DLLY].
198 Id. at 7.
199 Id. at 6.
200 Id. at 5.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 2010 Tax Agreement, supra note 197, at 1.
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Unclear jurisdictional limits set the stage for Tribal allegations
of encroachment by the State upon tribal sovereignty and the power of
the MHA Nation to self regulate their land, economic development, and
people within the borders of the Fort Berthold Reservation. Section D,
clause 9 of the 2010 Tax Agreement levies the first significant limitation
on Tribal authority. It states that the tribes agree not to impose addi-
tional taxes and fees on any oil and gas exploration or production activity
or interest within the Reservation.207 Section E, clause 4 sheds even more
light on the inherent tension between state and MHA authority as it once
again attempts to regulate the Tribe through a moratorium on imposition
of additional tribal taxes or fees on future production of oil and gas on
the reservation for the term of the agreement.208 Because the term of the
2010 Tax Agreement is indefinite, terminated by only one of the parties
seeking to break it, this clause essentially binds the Tribe to the 2010
standard forever.209
The third limitation comes under Section H, clause 3(c), which
states that future wells drilled and completed during the life of the 2010
Tax Agreement will be under State law and regulations for purposes of
oil and gas production.210 The clause continues, stating that any Tribal
laws and regulations drafted will be in conjunction only with state and
federal agencies.211 To add injury to insult, it goes a step further and binds
Tribal authority by insisting that law and regulation drafted by the Tribes
during the term of the 2010 Tax Agreement will not be applicable to wells
currently covered by the document.212
In effect, the 2010 Tax Agreement serves as a power-stripping
document. The agreement completely strips the Tribe of power to regu-
late or tax and gives no recourse for future problems or change in circum-
stances by the very fact that the duration of the agreement has been
labeled as indefinite. Proponents of the 2010 Tax Agreement will state
that the recourse available is to all out break the 2010 Tax Agreement.
They will point to the termination clause of the agreement that specifi-
cally grants the power of either party to terminate without cause or
207 Id. at 4 (explaining that the only allowable additional Tribal fees and taxes come from
Tribal Employment Rights Office (“TERO”) fee on wells on Trust Land and the one time
Tribal Application fee on wells on Trust Land).
208 Id.
209 2010 Tax Agreement, supra note 197, at 6.
210 Id. at 7.
211 Id.
212 Id. (stating that no regulation promulgated by the Tribe will have effect on wells drilled
or completed during the 2010 Tax Agreement).
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liability.213 On its face this would seem like a broad power of redress, but
in fact it stands as a threat.
This threat is further elaborated by the fact that termination can-
not be achieved without a good faith effort to resolve the differences lead-
ing to the Notice of Termination.214 This means that, even if MHA Nation
could or would want to leave the 2010 Tax Agreement, they would first
have to participate in rounds of mediation or arbitration. Assuming that
each round would last a significant amount of time, the Tribe is stalled out
from implementing the needed change and loses out on the additional
negotiated income. Because of the agreement, MHA Nation is left in a
unique place. MHA Nation has transformed reservation quality of life from
abject poverty to quality living with a future that reflects stability and
prosperity. Without the 2010 Tax Agreement and the revenue it generates,
companies would remain wary of contracting with the Tribal Business
Council on economic development issues.215 North Dakota therefore holds
significant leverage over the Tribe that results in a skewed tax agreement
riddled with limitations on Tribal authority that are extremely suspect
under federal and Tribal law.
With the limited recourse options available to amending the 2010
Tax Agreement, Chairman Tex Hall and the then-current Tribal Business
Council lobbied the Tribal and State Relations Committee in an attempt
to increase the tax revenue proceeds from Trust Lands.216 A letter was sent
to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on June 25, 2012.
The main motivation of the Tribe was listed as the need for increased
revenue from the Non-Trust Lands to increase government services and
to furnish a mitigation fund for the extreme infrastructure problems plagu-
ing the reservation.217 In a clever turn of negotiation, instead of insisting
that the state of North Dakota equalize the Non-Trust Land tax revenue
to a 50:50 split, Chairman Hall calls for a 80:20 division in favor of the
Tribe of tax revenue generated by Trust Lands.218 In an extreme charac-
terization, the letter states that under the current 2010 Tax Agreement
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Dalrymple, supra note 165.
216 MacPherson, supra note 40.
217 Letter from Tex “Red Tipped Arrow” Hall, Chairman, TAT—Mandan Hidatsa & Arikara
Nation, to David O’Connell and Donald Schaible, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Tribal
and State Relations Committee (June 25, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter
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the state reaps a $2 billion budget surplus while the MHA Nation “scrapes
by.”219 MHA Nation claims that their roads, natural resources, and the
safety of reservation residents are at stake and suffering due to the un-
equal treatment of tax revenue funds.220 Hall sets the stage for the cur-
rent flaring regulation battle with a pointed statement, “When the Tax
Agreement was negotiated, no one could foresee the impact the oil and gas
development would have on our roads, our police, and our social services.
It is unprecedented.”221
From the initial 2008 Tax Agreement that opened the reservation
to development, two-thirds of the tax revenue from the oil and gas pro-
duction has gone to the state.222 The one-third given to the Tribe cannot
sustain the damage to the infrastructure and is effectively crippling oil
and gas industry on the reservation.223 According to current projections,
it will take $1.5 million per mile to rebuild the roads to an effective grade
in order to withstand the grueling weight and amount of traffic gener-
ated by the oil companies.224 The letter concludes that a more equitable
share of the tax revenue is the only option to support current and future
energy development.225 It also states that the residents of the reservation
deserve a higher quality of life than that which has been decimated due
to the economic development unequal profit scheme.226
The battles over the 2010 Tax Agreement lay the foundation for
the ongoing debate surrounding the flaring regulations of the Fort Berthold
reservation. The situation of being routinely denied negotiations over the
2010 Tax Agreement terms pertaining to the tax revenue shares of both
Trust and Non-Trust Land on the reservation could be hypothesized as
the starting point for the Tribe seeking other possible revenue streams.
This search could have created the endeavor to harness the large rates
of flared natural gas from oil production in an attempt to improve resi-
dents’ quality of life and generate needed revenue to repair the MHA
Nation infrastructure.
219 Surplus and scrape characterized by amounts reflecting the 2012 figures. May 31,
2012 figures: State received $178 million. The MHA Nation received $100 million under
the 2010 tax agreement; see Letter from Tex Hall, supra note 217.
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5. Production and Flaring Concerns
Recently, Fort Berthold was reported as flaring 48% of the natural
gas produced in tandem with the oil production.227 MHA Nation links the
high rate of flaring to the lack of adequate pipelines and other infrastruc-
ture.228 Overall the state of North Dakota reports flaring of natural gas
production at a lesser percentage of thirty-six percent.229 In the latest gas
figures, oil companies are reporting a drop in oil production that has
allowed for flaring regulations to be implemented and met.230 The North
Dakota Industrial Commission reported that the benchmarks set by the
state requires a flaring cap of twenty-six percent for all natural gas
production by October 1, 2015.231 The benchmarks then drop significantly:
twenty-three percent by January 1, 2016, and fifteen percent within two
years, ultimately culminating in 2020 at a low ten percent.232 The state
of North Dakota incentivizes the oil companies to meet these percentages
by threatening penalties such as curtailment of production.233 Currently,
North Dakota reported flaring figures are twenty-four percent, a signifi-
cant drop from the reported rate of sixty-four percent in 2011.234
Unfortunately, even with the reported improved percentages, the
entire practice of flaring on Indian land remains unaddressed.235 North
Dakota’s figures may have dropped, but there has been little reporting
of flaring reduction on Trust Land.236 With such high percentages being
reported of flared gas, the most recent being forty-eight percent, the en-
vironmental concerns and alternative methods, such as capturing flared
gas in a bid for economic viability options, has come to the forefront of the
MHA Nation’s collective concern.
227 Amy Dalrymple, Tribe aims to cut high rate of flaring in half, OIL PATCH DISPATCH
(Apr. 25, 2014), http://oilpatchdispatch.areavoices.com/tag/fort-berthold/ [http://perma.cc
/9TAA-RZPJ].
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/latest-news/natural-gas/washington/falling-oil-price-rig-counts-helping-operators-21995007
[http://perma.cc/A5DG-HRUK].
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235 Talli Nauman, Oil flares lighting up North Dakota tribe’s skies, NATIVE SUN NEWS
(Feb. 9, 2015), available at http://www.Indianz.com/news/2015/016385.asp [http://perma
.cc/HD8M-8EJQ].
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6. Flaring Regulation by the State of North Dakota
The state of North Dakota—through the North Dakota Industrial
Commission—formed and passed a policy for flaring reduction within the
state.237 The first objective was to limit the number of wells currently flar-
ing natural gas by implementing a new permit requirement.238 The new
permit requirement consisted of a gas capture plan (“GCP”).239 GCPs are
detailed plans containing how much natural gas a company believes they
will be producing from a well, along with the method it chooses to deliver
natural gas to a processor, and the exact location where the natural gas
will be processed.240
The next step was to implement milestones for reduction of flared
gas in volume,241 by the number of wells flaring, and the duration of flar-
ing.242 The basic outline of the regulation stated that companies would
have sixty days to engage in maximum efficient rate of oil production.243
If the company is not in compliance with regulation their cap reduces to
200 barrels for sixty days.244 If the company remains noncompliant, the
cap drops to 150 barrels for sixty days.245 As soon as the company com-
plies with the regulation—by connecting wells to gas-gathering equip-
ment—and proves its capability to move the captured gas to a processing
facility, the caps immediately disappear and companies return to produc-
tion at maximum efficient rate.246
In sum, North Dakota’s flaring regulation consists of a requirement
for gas capture plans for any increase in production or for applications
to drill after June 1, 2014.247 The State plans to track the regulations
through semi-annual meetings with companies engaged in oil production
237 N.D. INDUS. COMM’N, 11:30 A.M. PRESENTATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL RE-
SOURCES REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA PETROLEUM COUNCIL FLARING TASK FORCE REPORT
AND CONSIDERATION OF IMPLEMENTATION STEPS 2014, available at https://www.dmr.nd
.gov/oilgas/presentations/NDIC030314_100.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP8N-4LV5].
238 Id.
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240 Press Release, Indus. Comm’n of N.D., NDIC adopts an additional flaring reduction
policy (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release Indus. Comm’n N.D.], available at http://
www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-press/DMR-Flaring140701.pdf [http://perma.cc/H6LP-LQFY].
241 Id. at 54.
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243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
2015] GAS, ROADS, AND GLORY 261
to gauge effects and correct deficiencies.248 The State also plans to apply
IT resources to create an easy access reporting system consisting of an
Internet report form.249 North Dakota further has a provision to track
and report on flaring, on and off Fort Berthold, compared to the goals set
by the Commission.250
7. Flaring Regulation by the MHA Nation
North Dakota’s flaring regulations have been touted as an inno-
vative system designed to tackle the issues of flaring—which are so prev-
alent in the state—by threat of production curtailment.251 Comparatively,
MHA Nation’s flaring regulation is designed as a policy that highlights
the needs of MHA tribal members and narrows the scope of flaring
regulations to administer solutions to the ongoing issues within reserva-
tion boundaries.252
a. Interplay Between Tribal Law and Federal Oversight
Because tribes and the federal government are set in a complex
relationship of “domestic, dependent nations” any action carried out by
a tribe falls under a federal approval scheme. Part of oil production, and
for the majority of economic development in general, is the federal
oversight system enabled through a multistep process.253 For the major-
ity of trust land issues, which implicate the fiduciary relationship held
by the federal government, the system consists of individualized Secre-
tarial approval and a permitting system that contracts between all three
parties (tribe, corporate entity, federal government).254 Indian lands that
are currently engaged in natural resource production contribute five per-
cent of domestic output in oil production flowing from Indian country.255
248 N.D. INDUS. COMM’N, supra note 237.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Press Release Indus. Comm’n of N.D., supra note 240.
252 See Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45.
253 To Amend the Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, S. 209,
114th Cong. (2015) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114s209is/pdf/BILLS
-114s209is.pdf [http://perma.cc/WH6W-MDWR].
254 See generally id.; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450–458(d)(d)(d)(2) (2012).
255 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 117, at § 17.03.
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In 2011 alone the Department of Interior authorized 4,843 mineral leases
on 2.7 million acres of Indian land.256
Economic development is a serious prerogative for both the MHA
Nation and the federal government, and when centered on minerals and
production of natural resources there is a long legislative history of tried
and discarded policy.257 In 1891, the Indian Mineral Development Act
defined mineral resources as “oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, or other
energy or nonenergy [sic] mineral resources.”258 For a mineral resource
to be under the control of a tribe or tribal member there must be a find-
ing that either: (a) the land was reserved for Indian tribes and therefore
the tribes hold the beneficial ownership of both soil and mineral inter-
ests; or, (b) the United States failed to make an express reservation of
interest in minerals.259 This finding also comes with the caveat that any
doubt of ownership of the mineral resource should be resolved in favor
of the tribe.260
The Indian Mineral Development Act was eventually amended in
1924 and 1927 with detrimental effects to tribal self determination,
mainly though a provision that allowed states to tax oil and gas produc-
tion on all tribal lands.261 The Secretary of Interior was enabled to pay
the state tax from the royalties of tribes.262 The 1938 enactment of the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act solidified the state tax provision but required
tribal consent and approval of the Secretary of Interior for any mineral
lease.263 It also included an exception under the right of Indian Reorgani-
zation Act (“IRA”) tribes to lease lands for mining in accordance with
their IRA charters or constitutions.264
In 1982, Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Development Act
(“IMDA”).265 IMDA was targeted to further self determination policy and
attempted to create financial profit from Indian mineral resources for the
benefit of tribes.266 The entire idea behind IMDA was to facilitate tribal
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., infra notes 258, 261, 263.
258 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
259 See United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938).
260 Id.
261 25 U.S.C. § 398.
262 Id.
263 Id. § 396(a)–(g).
264 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 117, at ch.1 §§ 1.05, 4.04(3)(a).
265 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108; see also Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 78 F.2d 1457
(9th Cir. 1986) (referencing the IMDA and the reasons for its enactment).
266 S. Rep. No. 97-472, at 2 (1982).
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control over mineral agreements in their entirety, from negotiation of an
operating agreement to setting exploration terms.267 IMDA still required
the Secretary of Interior (“SOI”) to review mineral agreements under the
standard of “in the best interest of the Indian tribe.”268 But the SOI was
allowed to look at factors such as potential economic return, potential
environmental and cultural effects, and provisions in the agreement
pertaining to resolution of disputes between parties.269
In addition to IMDA, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self Determination Act (“ITEDSA”) in 1992.270 ITEDSA
was the answer to addressing mineral development in an era of climate
change issues and a new national focus on non renewable resources.271
With the advent of the renewable energy mindset Congress took the ini-
tiative to grant tribes another avenue in economic development through
the process of energy development. The purpose of ITEDSA was stated
as the promotion of tribal economic self-sufficiency and increase of con-
trol over the future of Indian land.272 Tribes can form a tribal energy
resource agreement (“TERA”) with the Department of Interior under
ITEDSA.273 With a TERA a tribe can enter into “leases and other busi-
ness agreements for energy resource development and grant rights-of-
way for pipelines . . . without secretarial approval of the specific lease,
agreement or right-of-way.”274
b. Trust Liability of Federal Government with Tribes
In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II ) the Supreme Court held
that the federal government had fiduciary obligations to tribes in their
capacity as resource owners, “where the Federal Government takes on
or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties.”275 Tribes
267 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 117.
268 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b).
269 Id.
270 Id. §§ 3501–3506.
271 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 117.
272 H.R. Rep. No. 102-474 pt. 8, at 93 (1992).
273 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e).
274 Id. § 3504(a)–(b). But cf. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self Determination Act
Amendments of 2011: Hearings on S. 1684 Before Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
(2012) available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/Tex-Hall
-testimony041912.pdf [http://perma.cc/HG6Z-X3M4] (stating that no tribes had used the
TERA program from the testimony of Tex G. Hall).
275 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983).
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must show that statutory language that created a trust or federal control
over the resource,276 or a source of law that makes specific duties for the
government either implicit or explicit, and that the tribe in fact suffered
an injury by the breach of duty and requires an award of damages.277 Also,
neither the government nor the Secretary of Interior has a duty to maxi-
mize tribal returns.278
Where there has been subsequent erosion of findings of fiduciary
duties in coal leasing, the federal courts still find obligations for the SOI
in the oil and gas lease context.279 Mainly, the SOI must determine if the
lease is in the “best interest of the Indian”280 and to monitor the perfor-
mance of the party the tribe has contracted with.281 On top of that, the
SOI is charged with a trust duty to find an oil and gas royalty accounting
method that “best protect[s] the royalty interest of the [tribe].”282 The SOI
has the duty to look at all factors when considering whether a lease is in
the tribe’s best interest, which includes economic factors but also de-
mands a weighing of “all relevant factors.”283 All of the SOI’s duties and
obligations are under the requirement of “act[ing] in accordance with the
trust responsibility” and “in good faith and in the best interests of the
Indian tribes.”284
c. NTL-4A, The Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in Flaring
In the vein of fiduciary duties due to tribes, the Department of the
Interior through the Bureau of Land Management promulgated the NTL-
4A.285 The NTL-4A or Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Fed-
eral and Indian Oil and Gas Leases directly deals with oil production
subject to royalties.286 The standards of when royalty’s status applies
depend on two factors: (1) produced and sold on a lease basis for benefit
276 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2003).
277 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003).
278 Id. at 510–14.
279 Id. at 505.
280 Id.
281 Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1565 (10th Cir. 1984)
(Seymore, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 1566.
283 Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1992).
284 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(2012).
285 Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45; Notice to Lessees and Operator of Onshore
Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A), Dep’t of Interior (Jan. 1, 1980).
286 Id.
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of a lease approved by agreement, and (2) the Supervisor determines an
avoidable loss on a lease.287 NTL-4A is the controlling federal doctrine on
flaring regulations within Indian land.288 Royalty status applies unless:
(1) is used on the same lease, same communities tract, or
same unitized participating area for beneficial purposes,
(2) is vented or flared with the Supervisor’s prior autho-
rization or approval during drilling, completing or pro-
ducing operations, (3) is vented or flared pursuant to the
rules, regulations, or order of the appropriate State regu-
latory agency when said rules, regulations, or orders have
been ratified or accepted by the Supervisor, or (4) the
Supervisor determines it to have been an otherwise un-
avoidable loss.289
When royalty status applies the Indian lessor receives a portion com-
puted on the basis of the full value of the gas wasted or the portion that
is attributable to the lease.290
The second factor of the finding of applicable royalties, “avoidably
lost” is defined as:
[W]hen the Supervisor determines that such loss occurred
as result of (1) negligence on the part of the lessee or oper-
ator, or (2) the failure of the lessee or operator to take all
reasonable measures to prevent and/or to control the loss,
or (3) the failure of the lessee or operator to comply fully
with applicable lease terms and regulations . . . or (4) any
combination of the foregoing.291
Section III of the notice also has a provision for authorized venting and
flaring of gas. The four categories are narrow, defined as emergencies,
well purging and evaluation tests, initial production tests, and routine
or special well tests.292 The Notice then goes further and clearly defines
that “Oil Well Gas” may not be flared outside of those four exceptions
287 NTL-4A, supra note 285, at 1–2.
288 Id. at 1.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 2.
291 Id. at Sec. II “Definitions.”
292 Id. at 3.
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unless approved by the Supervisor.293 Justifications for exception approval
hinges on a showing that the cost of marketing or beneficial use of the
gas would not be economically justified and if it were required, that it
would result in an abandonment of the oil reserves and therefore a loss.294
Another justification could be an action plan that would eliminate flaring
of gas within one year of application.295
d. MHA Nation’s Flaring Regulations
MHA Nation’s flaring regulations derive their power from the
facilitating documents of the Indian Reorganization Act, namely MHA’s
constitution that authorizes the Tribal Business Council to promulgate
and pass legislation on behalf of the tribal members.296 MHA’s flaring reg-
ulation preamble painstakingly states that the Tribal Business Council
is creating their own flaring regulation because of the Bureau of Land
Management’s (“BLM”) failure to enforce NTL-4A297 that covers flaring
of gas on Indian land.298 Finding a failure on the part of the BLM, the
Tribe then found it to be in its “best interest” to regulate flared gas on
the reservation.299 The Tribal Business Council specifically listed two rea-
sons for the flaring regulation: (a) the lack of enforcement by the BLM,
and (b) flaring is “wasteful and contributes to air pollution.”300
The first regulation that the Tribe levies against the oil compa-
nies is that gas produced in tangent with crude oil can be flared for one
year.301 After a year has passed from the first production date, the com-
pany must regulate their flaring by capping the well completely, connect-
ing to a gas gathering line, or by equipping their production units with
electrical generators that use seventy-five percent of the gas from the
well.302 If the well continues to operate outside the MHA regulation then
the producer must pay royalties to the Tribe computed at the value of the
flared gas added to the federal gross production tax on flared gas.303 The
293 NTL-4A, supra note 285, at 3.
294 Id. at 4.
295 Id.
296 E.g., Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45.
297 Id. at 1, 3.
298 NTL-4A, supra note 285.
299 See Resolution No. 13-070-VJB, supra note 45, at 1, 3.
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301 Id. at 1.
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303 Id. at 1–2.
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MHA Nation itself will survey for violations and if an operator is found
to be in violation the Tribal Business Council will determine the value
of the flared gas for payment royalties.304
MHA Nation does provide a flaring exemption provision. The
producer must show through an application to MHA Nation Energy
Department that connection to a well is “economically infeasible” at pres-
ent time of application or in the near future.305 Another flaring exemption
states that if the cost of connection to a gathering line is greater than
what the producer will derive from the sale of the gas (minus taxes and
royalties) then the producer shall be exempted.306 The resolution also
states that the royalties and taxes taken from this regulation will be
used exclusively for the “maintenance, repair, and construction of tribal
roads within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.”307
8. Regulation Conclusions
In sum, both North Dakota and MHA Nation have promulgated
and attempted to implement their individual flaring regulations on the
oil producers within Fort Berthold Reservation. The state of North Dakota
has proven themselves as diligent investors in the development of oil
production, to increase the state’s economic productivity.308 However,
North Dakota has also proven that when the opportunity arises that cre-
ates financial gain in favor of the state only that they will seize the oppor-
tunity and refuse to negotiate with the Tribe, regardless of demonstrated
need and ownership of the MHA Nation.309 This can be seen in the fact
that when negotiating over both tax agreements the state of North
Dakota continued to adhere to a mismatched benefit ratio in regards to
the Non-Trust Land revenues.310 Tribal lands and oil production should
be 50:50 regardless of Trust or Non-Trust Land designation because the
oil production is generated in the boundaries of Fort Berthold and is
therefore taxing the reservation’s infrastructure, people, and services.
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The state reaps a disproportionate amount of benefits from MHA
Nation oil production on the reservation.311 As a state leader in oil pro-
duction domestically, North Dakota legislature should be aware that in-
frastructure needs, such as roads and government services, are a major
concern in these economic development projects. MHA Nation has a
federally protected right to govern themselves through the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, and the state cannot infringe upon this right.312 The
terms of both 2008 and 2010 Tax Agreements are skewed in North Da-
kota’s favor, resulting in lost revenue generated by the reservation but
never reaped for the benefit of its tribal members. This disconnect of the
state demonstrates that North Dakota cannot be, and will never be, in
the best position to promulgate rules on flaring regulation within the
reservation boundary.
While MHA Nation’s flaring regulations are ambitious and clearly
established to serve the needs of the reservation, they too have legal and
implementation problems. The fiduciary relationship between the Federal
Government and the Tribe demands flaring regulation by federal policy
through the present rule of the Bureau of Land Management presented
in NTL-4A.313
II. RESOLVING THE POWER TO REGULATE
A. Is North Dakota’s Flaring Regulations Applicable to
Fort Berthold?
The state of North Dakota cannot regulate natural gas flaring on
Fort Berthold Reservation because there is a long history of leaving
tribes and tribal members outside state jurisdiction due to tribal sover-
eignty established by Chief Justice Marshall.314 State law is generally not
applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of the tribe.315 The only
way that a state can have jurisdiction is by consent of Congress and the
Worcester v. Georgia case has been the established precedent regarding
express Congressional consent. The Worcester case determined that the
311 Id.
312 See supra Part II.
313 See generally Brandon Evans, Bakken Oil, gas producers decry new federal regulations,
GAS DAILY, 3 (Oct. 20, 2015) (explaining that Bureau of Land Management released proposed
rules addressing calculations of royalties that require federal drilling permits and new vent-
ing and flaring regulations for fracking on federal and Indian land) (on file with author).
314 See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
315 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562–63 (1832).
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Constitution gave broad authority over Indian issues solely to the federal
government, and that treaties between tribes generally reserved tribal
self-governance within the territory of the contracting tribe.316 Chief Justice
Marshall also made it clear that the acts and interest of states would
inherently be against that of the federal government and Indian tribes.317
Therefore states would interfere on an unacceptable level with the federal
agenda.318 The Supreme Court has consistently held to the fact that the key
holdings of Worcester have remained intact and therefore create prece-
dent which cannot be overturned unless by an act of Congress.319
B. Is MHA Nation’s Flaring Regulation Applicable to Fort
Berthold Reservation?
Even though MHA Nation passed their resolution under the power
derived from the MHA constitution, which is empowered through the In-
dian Reorganization Act (federal law), the regulation cannot be imple-
mented against companies on the reservation under the current federal
policy of regulation and tribal self determination. The main problem is
that tribal regulation cannot overtake the already applicable BLM flaring
regulation found in NTL-A4.320 Tribes may be “domestic, dependent na-
tions” and retain inherent sovereignty, but when treaties came into play
between the tribes and the federal government, tribes sacrificed part of
their sovereignty in return for a permanent contractual relationship with
the United States. Basically, tribal sovereignty is “subject always to the
paramount authority of the United States.”321 The Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution bars any other entity from creating law that attempts to
circumvent federal law as the reigning authority in the United States.322
Unfortunately, because of the power of the Supremacy Clause, the
MHA Nation belief that BLM is not enforcing the NTL-4A and therefore
is afforded the right to create flaring standards does not in fact grant the
316 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556, 560–61.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). See also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S.
759, 764–65 (1985) (stating that states are barred from taxing tribal royalties from mineral
leases on trust land).
320 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
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State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
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Tribe express power to promulgate flaring regulations without the fed-
eral government.323 There is no legal precedent, act, regulation, or rule
to bolster the Tribe’s independent creation of regulation against the ap-
plicable federal regulation already in place.
Instead, the best way to enforce application of the NTL-4A provi-
sions would be to instigate legal action against the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, and therefore the Secretary of Interior, for a breach of mandatory
duty. Specifically, the Tribe should allege that SOI breached their duty
in the fact that when approving the oil and gas leases they failed to take
into consideration the “factors” outside of economic benefit.324 As proof of
the outside factors that fall into the category of environmental and cul-
tural resource damage the Tribe should put forth evidence of: the deterio-
ration of the roads; increase in crime; and at the very heart of this entire
issue, the fact that natural gas flaring at such high rates is destroying
the environment of the Fort Berthold Reservation.325
To be entirely transparent, the additional problem with the MHA
regulation is that there are several clauses with the MHA Nation resolu-
tion that are directly against, or in breach of, federal law already regulating
the issue.326 Namely that MHA Nation is attempting to force oil producers
to pay taxes that the Tribe will set independently of any present regula-
tion, rules, or federal acts. Also, the provision that Tribal determination
would be final with no redress or appeal policy in place could equate to a
potential Due Process claim. To add to the issue, the Tribe also attempted
to add on an additional tax through requiring oil producers to foot the bill
on the federal tax on processed natural gas.
MHA Nation has overstepped their inherent Tribal authority and
the their self promulgated flaring regulation cannot be sustained or im-
plemented against the oil producers on the reservation.
C. Tribal Sovereignty and Policy of Self Determination:
How Should MHA Nation Assert Authority over the Issue
of Natural Gas Flaring on the Fort Berthold Reservation?
Currently the overall policy goal of Congress, the Executive, and
at times the judiciary is self-determination in every aspect of tribal
323 Id.
324 Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 589.
325 See Tollefson, supra note 18; see also Phil Davies, Homeland of Opportunity, Fed.
Reserve Bank Minneapolis (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications
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sovereignty for all tribes within the United States.327 With that in mind,
and with the knowledge that the purpose of ITEDSA was stated as the
promotion of tribal economic self-sufficiency with the additional purpose
of increasing tribal control over the future of Indian lands, MHA Nation
should seek to enforce their authority using the broad policy arguments
within ITEDSA.328
ITEDSA creates a clear path for MHA Nation to exercise author-
ity over their economic development through TERAs. A TERA grants
MHA the power to enter into leases and other business agreements for
energy resource development and to grant rights-of-way for pipelines
without secretarial approval of the specific lease, agreement, or right-of-
way.329 Without the need for Secretarial approval MHA Nation could lay
the infrastructure for gas capture, which would force oil producers into
adhering to the NTL-4A provisions. Specifically, MHA could create gas-
gathering pipelines, build a processing plant, curb the extreme flaring on
reservation, and basically reap all the benefits that they were trying to
create through the tribal flaring regulations without the necessary over-
sight that comes with the current federal government–tribal relationship
rules and duties.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of natural gas flaring on Fort Berthold Reserva-
tion is an ongoing issue for state, federal, and tribal authorities. Natural
gas flaring in itself can directly effect the climate change scale as scien-
tists believe that four million tons of CO2 emissions was added to the
atmosphere over the year of 2012. Flaring regulation of the Bakken
Shale production must be implemented against the oil producers in the
region. But the state of North Dakota cannot apply its state regulation to
Fort Berthold reservation due to historical precedent set by Chief Justice
Marshall, and because of the tribal-federal relationship over property, tax-
ation, and economic development has existed firmly outside state jurisdic-
tion. In addition to the lack of state jurisdiction, there is an abundance of
negative history that highlights the fact that States lack the control and
relevant knowledge of tribal authority to carry out the best procedures
and policies that benefit both the tribes and states in equal measures. On
327 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 3502(a)(1).
328 See Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3506.
329 See id.
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the other side, MHA Nation’s flaring regulation cannot be upheld or applied
in its current form. The MHA Nation regulation bases its entire power
on the idea that the Secretary of Interior, via the Department of Interior,
via the Bureau of Land Management failed to enforce the provisions of
NTL-4A. But a breach of duty does not create the power to independently
create and apply Tribal regulation within the reservation boundaries.
The goal of the MHA regulations are clear: they intend to capture,
use, and profit from their currently wasted natural resources. The Tribal
Business Council clearly states in their resolution for flaring practices
that any money or royalties derived from the policy will automatically
feed back into the management and development of the road system
within the reservation. Clearly, the goal of the Tribe is worthy in its effect
of fixing the detrimental infrastructure effects that the Tribe currently
suffers from through capturing a Tribal natural resource and mitigating
the negative effects of flared gas.
With the goal of improving the conditions of the reservation and
mitigating flared gas effects to facilitate oil production and improve the
Tribal health and safety, MHA Nation should promulgate a TERA under
the ITEDSA Act. With an affirmative TERA in place the Tribe will be al-
lowed to create the mechanism and production facilities necessary to
capture the flared gas and therefore enforce royalty payments or use the
flared gas under NTL-4A. In this vein MHA Nation would be in complete
compliance with federal regulation while achieving their set goals of im-
proving infrastructure, mitigating negative environmental effects, and
creating benefits for all Tribal members. With the use of the TERA the
Tribe can bide their time and control their economic development until
a period where tribes will be charged by the federal government to take
complete control of tribal goals, economic development, and general wel-
fare decisions.
In conclusion, North Dakota flaring regulations will not be appli-
cable to Fort Berthold Reservation, leaving MHA Nation’s proposed goals
the opportunity to become aligned with current federal law, which will
produce a tribally based regulation standard through the use of current
federal law and programs applicable to the situation at hand under the
limited scope of tribal self determination currently promoted.
